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Introduction 
The hydropower boom across the global South to build up energy infrastructure has been enabled by a 
range of factors: technological progress that makes it easier to extract water from difficult terrain; new 
forms and origins of finance from emerging economies, in particular China, that have largely replaced 
public funding for hydropower from the global North; and a global climate change discourse that 
encourages investment into hydropower and incentivises it through a range of market mechanisms 
including the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).i  
 
The latter involves what Wanner (2015: 21) called the ‘neoliberalising of nature’ through the 
‘privatisation, marketisation and commodification of nature’ which ‘divert[s] attention from the social and 
political dimensions of sustainability and issues of social and international justice.’ Green growth has been 
promoted by key UN agencies including UNDP and UNEP. UNEP argues that ‘to be green, an economy 
must not only be efficient, but also fair. Fairness implies recognising global and country level equity 
dimensions, particularly in assuring a just transition to an economy that is low-carbon, resource efficient, 
and socially inclusive’ (UNEP 2011: 24). Meanwhile, the World Social Forum has criticised the green 
economy agenda as the ‘latest phase of capitalist expansion [that] seeks to exploit and profit by putting a 
price value on the essential life-giving capacities of nature’ (cited in Middleton et al. 2015: 640).  
 
Chinese infrastructure companies are investing in hydropower invited by host governments who have 
adopted the green energy terminology. The question is to what extent this investment is equitable and 
socially inclusive. As China is now Africa’s most important partner in the construction of infrastructure, 
the extent to which Chinese firms adopt and implement environmental and social sustainability policies 
is important for the question of justice in Chinese investment projects, and research found that such 
policies – where they exist – are often formulated vaguely and implemented inconsistently (Hensengerth 
2013; Cissé and Grimm 2015; Nordensvard et al. 2015; Hensengerth 2015a). 
 
Nexus has become a popular concept in international development as it purports to address trade-offs 
between competing sectors drawing on the same resources (Bhaduri et al. 2014; Bhaduri et al. 2015). For 
hydropower, this primarily means the water-energy nexus, in other words the use of water for different 
uses, such as agriculture, energy and industry. In this trade-off, distributional issues between different 
sectors are addressed, but the impact on local communities is often neglected or treated as a side issue. 
A key question to answer is therefore who makes decisions for who in nexus both in general and in the 
specific case of hydropower, and how decisions can be made in an equitable manner so that communities 
affected by hydropower dams are involved in decision-making and benefit from the project. 
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This chapter deals with this governance question in the water-energy nexus by using an environmental 
justice perspective in order to focus on the impact of hydropower plants on local communities. The 
chapter draws particularly on David Schlosberg’s seminal work on environmental justice and Carl 
Middleton’s work on livelihoods and justice within the nexus (Schlosberg 2004; Middleton et al. 2015).  
 
The chapter first sets out the problems of justice and governance in the water-energy nexus for 
hydropower development before addressing their transnational dimensions, which is produced by the 
involvement of transnationally operating corporations and financiers. The chapter then explores China’s 
hydropower investment in Africa, followed by a brief description of Chinese engagement in Ghana’s 
electricity sector. The chapter then explores the case of resettlement in the Bui dam project in detail.  
 
Data comes from field work conducted during two weeks in July 2010 in Accra and at the dam site. All 
interviewees were assured anonymity given the political sensitivity of the issue. To ensure anonymity all 
interviews are coded, with the first letter indicating the place of interview and the sequence of numbers 
indicating the date. In Accra, interviews were held with the Bui Power Authority, the Energy Commission, 
the Water Resources Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning, the Ministry of Energy, researchers, civil society organizations, and OECD donor 
agencies. At the dam site, interviews were held with community representatives in the Gyama temporary 
resettlement site and in villages still facing resettlement. At the time of interview Bui was still under 
construction and resettlement was ongoing. The 2010 material is therefore updated with literature that 
draws on field work conducted after this date, particularly after completion of the resettlement 
programme.  
 
Justice in the water-energy nexus 
The term nexus, which in international development practice has almost replaced the term Integrated 
Water Resources Management, denotes the interlinked nature between water use, food production, land 
use, and energy generation. In the literature it appears in different guises, including water-food-energy 
nexus, water-energy-climate change nexus and various other iterations of similar ideas (see for example 
Dale et al. 2015; Andrews-Speed et al. 2015; Biba 2016). In this chapter the focus will be on the links 
between water use and energy production and the impact this has on local communities and ecosystems. 
In this sense the chapter treats the water-energy nexus as a water-energy-environment nexus.   
 
Nexus has often been used in quantifiable input-output terms considering factors such as water and land 
availability, crop yields, and distribution patterns (Bazilian et al. 2011; Smajgl et al. 2016; Leung Pah Hang 
et al. 2016). While some point primarily to a need for better coordination between different sectors (Rasul 
2016), others have pointed to scalar a mismatch between the place of extraction and the location of 
beneficiaries (Gilron 2014). Biggs et al. (2015) argued that nexus frameworks have long lacked an explicit 
focus on livelihoods perspectives. In a similar vein, Middleton et al. (2015) and Allouche et al. (2014a) 
point to the need for considering environmental justice within the nexus and thus exploring nexus from a 
rights-based perspective by exploring the power and policy dynamics within nexus.  
 
Key to this justice perspective is the impact of extractive water use by large hydropower plants on local 
communities. Large hydropower plants often transmit the energy extracted locally to urban residential 
and industrial centres. Magee has argued that the watershed is therefore an inadequate unit of analysis, 
coining the term ‘powershed’ to reflect firstly how local plants benefit often users far-away from the 
location of the hydropower plant, and secondly the role of – and power relationship between – 
hydropower companies, local politicians and national decision-makers (Magee 2006; McNally et al. 2009). 
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The consequence is that nexus not only describes sectoral competition between different water users and 
uses, but it also points to scalar trade-offs between local, national and global development goals 
(Hensengerth 2015b). As to the question of how to govern these trade-offs, Allouche et al. (2014b: 8) 
pointed out that the  
 
governance of these decisions, namely who takes decisions and for whom, is also important 
yet has been less rigorously discussed to date. Furthermore, given that food, water and 
energy sectors often exist in silos, integration may be challenging to put into practice. That 
water, land and energy have different governing regimes will make nexus governance even 
more difficult.   
  
These conflicts, plus a focus on livelihoods perspectives, can be articulated through the concept of 
environmental justice. To do so, this chapter employs Schlosberg’s (2004) conceptualization of 
environmental justice as incorporating the following three elements:  
 
equity in the distribution of environmental risk [and goods], recognition of the diversity of 
the participants and experiences in affected communities, and participation in the political 
processes which create and manage environmental policy (Schlosberg 2004: 517).  
 
Building on the work of Iris Young and Nancy Fraser, Schlosberg points out that social justice needs to 
simultaneously address ‘institutionalised exclusion, a social culture of misrecognition, and current 
distributional patterns’ (p. 519). 
 
In the context of the water-energy nexus, such a perspective enables a focus on local communities that 
are affected by development interventions. For justice to be realized, decision-makers need to address 
the effect development interventions have on communities. This is particularly true for communities who 
derive their livelihoods from local water sources that are earmarked for hydropower generation. This is 
especially important as new hydropower locations are often in remote and difficult to access locations 
and are mostly inhabited by rural communities who derive their livelihoods inter alia from subsistence 
agriculture, fishing or non-timber forest products – with some of the produce sold on local markets – but 
also indigenous communities with distinct cultural or religious traditions associated with rivers and forests 
as abode of protective deities and ancestral spirits.  
 
The transnational dimension of the water-energy nexus: China’s investment in Africa’s energy 
infrastructure and the role of hydropower  
Local socio-ecological systems can not only be affected by national development strategies, but also by 
global processes and are therefore influenced by events, actors and processes occurring at different scales 
(Young et al. 2006; Zurlini et al. 2006). Smitts and Middleton (2014: 564-565) pointed out that hydropower 
discourses are created by actors who come together in different arenas, and these configurations create 
specific power relations and decisions. They argue that these arenas can be simultaneously multi-scale 
and multi-place. Looking at the CDM mechanisms as an incentive structure for private investment into 
large hydropower stations, the authors list global (CDM Executive Board), national (Designated National 
Authorities, international and national consultants), and local (project developers, local authorities, 
affected people) arenas or scales (p. 565, Table 1).  
 
Within the same scale, however, competing discourses and power configurations exist. This is particularly 
so for the local scale where Smitts and Middleton locate project developers and project-affected people. 
When looking at Chinese developers, we might also locate them at the international level to the extent 
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that they operate transnationally. This is important as dam funding has seen a marked shift. Since the 
emergence of the environmental sustainability discourse in the global North in the 1980s, public funding 
for large dams via donors grouped in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee has all but 
disappeared. This funding has been replaced by infrastructure companies and financiers from emerging 
economies, driven by strategic motives of profit and market access. Chinese companies have now 
emerged as global leaders in the hydropower industry, a phenomenon linked to processes of globalization 
as well as the emergence of new donors and investors as a new source of infrastructure finance and 
construction.  
 
Looking at Chinese activities in Africa in the infrastructure and energy sectors, according to a report by 
South Africa’s Standard Bank, cited in a 2012 OECD report, China funded about two-thirds of African 
infrastructure since 2007, surpassing the World Bank (Freemantle and Stevens 2010 cited in OECD 2012: 
48). In the energy sector, Chinese involvement in a range of projects including ‘hydropower dams, gas-
fired power plants and biogas appliances in rural villages, and construction of transmission lines and 
distribution networks tends to diversify the power generation capacity mix and increase energy access in 
urban as well as rural areas’ (International Energy Agency 2016: 10. See the map below for details on 
geographical distribution and types of Chinese energy projects).  
 
Map: Greenfield power projects contracted to Chinese companies, 2010-20 
 
© OECD/IEA 2016 Partner Country Series: Boosting the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, China’s Involvement, IEA 
Publishing. Licence: www.iea.org/t&c 
 
In the hydropower field Chinese infrastructure companies and banks have emerged as leading builders 
and financiers of large hydropower dams, benefitting strongly from the reluctance of Northern donors to 
fund such dams (the World Bank has recently re-engaged in funding large dams, provoking a conflict with 
U.S. Congress who has instructed the U.S. government through the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act 
to deny funding of these projects: Bosshard 2014; U.S. House of Representatives 2014: Section 7060). The 
China Overseas Dams List by International Rivers (last updated in November 2014) lists at 60 large 
hydropower or multipurpose projects pursued by Chinese companies in Africa in various stages of 
decision-making – from very initial considerations to the project having been completed. 
 
The following sections explore these issues with relevance to Ghana. First we will look at Ghana’s 
electricity supply situation, followed by Chinese involvement in the Ghanaian electricity sector, before 
focussing on resettlement in the Bui hydroelectric project. 
 
Ghana’s electricity supply situation and the role of China in expanding capacity  
Ghana traditionally relied on hydropower produced by the Akosombo dam, commissioned in 1965. In 
1982, the Kpong dam was commissioned. In 2013, the Bui dam was commissioned with the aim to add 
substantial capacity to the grid and to diversify economic growth away from the Southern regions into the 
North. A fourth hydropower project, the Pwalugu Multipurpose dam on the White Volta River, is currently 
undergoing feasibility studies and an environmental and social impact assessment. In the late 1990s, oil 
became an important fuel with the first thermal plant coming online at Takoradi (330MW) in 1997 and a 
second plant at Takoradi in 2000 (the 220 MW Takoradi II plant). Since the late 2000s natural gas has 
increased in importance (see Figure 1 and International Energy Agency 2016: 35). At the end of December 
2014, hydropower contributed 55.8 percent of total installed capacity – of this Akosombo constituted 36 
percent, Kpong 14.1 percent, and Bui 5.7 percent – thermal power contributed 44.1 percent, and 
renewables in the form of solar 0.1 percent (Energy Commission of Ghana 2015: 5). 
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Figure 1: Electricity Generation by Fuel in Ghana 
 
© OECD/IEA 2016 IEA Energy Statistics, www.iea.org/statistics. Licence: www.iea.org/t&c 
Direct link to source: http://www.iea.org/stats/WebGraphs/GHANA2.pdf (accessed 21 December 2016) 
 
Odoom (2015) argued that China has become a key partner in Ghana’s development due to its provision 
of infrastructure, particularly in the energy field including hydropower and gas plants. Chinese companies 
are active across a number of fuels, as well as in the distribution sector. In 2007, Shenzhen Energy and the 
China Development Fund created the Sunon Asogli Power Company for a gas-fired plant at Tema. In 
addition, Sinohydro is Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contractor for the China 
Development Bank-funded Western Corridor Gas Infrastructure Development Project. Phase I, 
commissioned in April 2015, connects the Jubilee oil fields via a gas processing plant at Atuabo to the 
plants at Takoradi. Phase II is to build an offshore jetty system to connect the Jubilee fields via ship to 
Tema (International Energy Agency 2016: 35).  
 
Further, China Exim Bank provided China International Water and Electric Corporation with loans to 
participate in Ghana’s rural electrification projects, particularly in the Upper West Electrification Project 
where the firm built power transmission lines to connect 468,000 households. In addition, Hunan 
Construction Engineering Group participated in the Northern Regional Electrification project. In April 
2016, Ghana’s 20MW solar PV plant came online, which was developed by a private Chinese company 
(International Energy Agency 2016: 36).   
 
In the hydropower field, Sinohydro was EPC contractor for the Bui hydropower plant, and it is this project 
which will occupy the remainder of the chapter. 
 
China and the Bui dam 
The Bui dam forms a key part of Ghana’s electricity supply strategy with the aim to diversify economic 
growth away from the South to the North. It is controversially located on the Black Volta River where it 
flooded a substantial part of Bui National Park. Bui was commissioned in December 2013. With an installed 
capacity of 400MW the dam produced 730 gigawatt hours in 2014 (Energy Commission of Ghana 2015). 
The output of the dam was meant to increase as the reservoir reaches full capacity (International Energy 
Agency 2016: 36).  
 
The history of the planning of the Bui Dam dates back to 1925, when Albert Kitson discovered the Bui 
Gorge and found it suitable for a hydroelectric dam. However, although by 1978 plans for Bui had reached 
an advanced planning stage, the plans suffered from coups d’état, the relative cost of thermal power, and 
a lack of interest by companies to bid for tenders. In 2002, in a renewed attempt to build Bui but facing a 
lack of interest by companies to bid for a tender, President Kufuor decided to ask China and Russia for 
help. In 2005, the government announced that the Chinese government had expressed willingness to fund 
the dam, with financing from China Exim Bank and construction by Sinohydro. The government tasked 
UK-based Environmental Resources Management to conduct an Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment (ESIA) and a Resettlement Planning Framework (RPF), which the firm submitted in 2007 (for 
a detailed history see Fink 2005: 69-72). In 2007 the Ghanaian parliament passed Act 740 establishing the 
Bui Power Authority as project owner with full responsibility for planning, executing and managing the 
Bui project (Zigah 2009: 25). 
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As EPC contractor Sinohydro was in charge only of dam construction, but resettlement fell into the 
responsibility of the BPA. Nevertheless, it was Chinese initiative that eventually led to the realization of 
Bui, which otherwise might have remained stuck in the planning phase (Kirchherr et al. 2016). The project 
is part of the Chinese government’s Going Out strategy by which it lends political and financial support to 
Chinese companies wanting to expand their investment activities abroad. As seen above, Ghana is an 
increasingly important market for Chinese energy investment, and the Bui investment can be seen as a 
strategic decision to gain access to that market.  
 
Bui is firmly embedded in a discourse of reliable energy supply for economic growth as well as green 
growth. This however neglects the human dimension of the investment and as a consequence the 
problem of social justice. By looking at the resettlement of Bui, it is this issue area to which we now turn.  
 
Resettlement and livelihoods in the Gyama resettlement community 
A total of seven villages plus the Bui National Park personnel living at Bui Camp had to be resettled. This 
was the responsibility of the Resettlement Office, established in the Bui Power Authority (BPA). 
Resettlement was divided into three phases: A, B and C. During Phase A, which began in May 2008, the 
four villages at the dam site were resettled: Brewohodi, Agbegikuro, Dam Site and Lucene were relocated 
to the Gyama Resettlement Community by June 2012, after first having been relocated to a temporary 
resettlement site. During Phase B, which started in June 2010, the inhabitants of villages in the inundation 
area were resettled: Bui Village, Bator-Akanyakrom and Dokokyina were relocated to Bui Resettlement 
Township by June 2011 between Bongase and the dam site. The BPA emphasized that this resettlement 
location was agreed with the resettlers. During Phase C, the personnel of the Game and Wildlife Division 
working at Bui National Park and living at Bui Camp was resettled (Bui Power Authority, no date_a; Bui 
Power Authority, no date_b). In total 219 households or 1216 people were resettled. 
 
Recommendations for resettlement were spelled out in the Resettlement Planning Framework (RPF) 
submitted by UK-based consultancy Environmental Resources Management in January 2007 together 
with the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment. The RPF will form the basis of analysis to assess 
the extent to which the BPA adhered to resettlement guidelines regarding the implementation of 
recommendations for public participation and livelihood reconstruction. 
 
Legal basis 
The RPF uses World Bank guidelines and Ghanaian law to lay out requirements for resettlement. The 
World Bank Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement (O.P. 4.12 and its Annex A), the World Bank 
Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook and Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, 1986 Land Title Registration Act, 
1962 State Lands Act, 1962 Administration of Lands Act, 1960 State Property and Contracts Act and 1965 
Public Conveyancing Act.  
 
A striking difference between Ghanaian and World Bank standards is that Ghanaian legislation does not 
require public participation in expropriation or the development of resettlement sites; however, Ghanaian 
regulations for Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) require public consultations during 
which resettlement issues may be raised (Environmental Resources Management 2007: 67, 70). Minutes 
of local consultations held during the ESIA phase and lists of stakeholders included in the ESIA study are 
annexed to the RPF (Environmental Resources Management 2007: Annex E and F).  
 
To reconcile these differences, the RPF recommended that ‘[p]ublic participation in the process of land 
acquisition and proposed resettlement must be promoted. Procedures or guidelines for such public 
consultation ought also to be clearly spelt out’ (Environmental Resources Management 2007: 78).  
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For the development of resettlement areas, the RPF suggested that:  
 
New resettlement sites or host communities must be provided with basic infrastructure and 
public services to ensure that basic levels of amenities are accessible to the displaced persons 
and host communities. The provisions of the 1992 Constitution which requires that 
resettlement sites must be ‘suitable’ having due regard for their economic well-being and 
social and cultural values should be adhered to (Environmental Resources Management 
2007: 79).  
 
According to the World Bank Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook, resettlement sites should be 
‘acceptable to the resettlers; have the capacity to support the incomes and living standards of the people 
to be resettled; provide for population growth; supply infrastructure and services better than, or at least 
similar to those available before resettlement; and be incorporated into the jurisdiction of local 
government agencies before completion of the resettlement programme’ (Environmental Resources 
Management 2007: 101 and Box 10.1). In addition, according to Ghanaian and World Bank standards, 
resettlement villages must be equivalent to or better than the original settlements (Environmental 
Resources Management 2007: 101). 
 
The RPF identifies three groups of affected persons eligible for compensation: Group 1 comprises 
households requiring resettlement, and these are entitled to full rehabilitation measures. Group 2 
comprises households that lose land but do not need to be resettled; these will receive compensation for 
land (should they own it), crops, trees, grazing and forest products. Households that lose more than 20 
per cent of their land will be captured by a Livelihood Enhancement Programme that is designed to 
produce livelihoods of at least the same level as before relocation. Group 3 comprises host communities; 
these will receive rehabilitation measures in relation to ‘pressure on natural resources, public 
infrastructure, and social services.’ In addition to all the above, households ‘with limited resources’ will 
receive additional help with relocation; households ‘unable to restore or improve their livelihoods’ after 
relocation will be classified as vulnerable and will receive special assistance (Environmental Resources 
Management 2007: 83-84, 90, Table 9.3).  
 
Compensation is of four types: cash, in-kind (‘land, houses, other structures, building materials, seedlings, 
agricultural inputs and financial credits for equipment’), assistance (such as a ‘transition allowance, 
transportation and labour’) and replacement (‘of public services, infrastructure and productive assets 
such as fish ponds’) (Environmental Resources Management 2007: 90, Table 9.2, 96). 
 
In the following the focus is on the Gyama resettlement site, where the relocated villages fall into group 
1, i.e. households requiring resettlement.  
 
Implementation 
Miine (2014: 75-77) and Obour et al. (2016: 293-294) report that access to health care, education and 
housing has overall improved for the resettled population. Furthermore Bui resettlement was a marked 
improvement when compared to the Akosombo dam resettlement (Obour et al. 2016). However, 
significant problems in livelihoods restoration remain.  
 
To oversee and monitor resettlement the RPF suggested the creation of a Steering Committee composed 
of official representatives of the BPA, district officials, chiefs, the Land Valuation Board and NGOs. The 
Steering Committee would have cooperated with a Working Group made up of a Resettlement 
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Coordinator, village representatives, NGOs and technical personnel in charge of host site preparation 
(architects, agricultural experts, etc.). The Working Group would have been responsible for implementing 
resettlement, including pre-resettlement consultation and overseeing the process of relocation – which 
would have involved regular coordination with the construction contractor. After resettlement, the 
Working Group would have been responsible for implementing and monitoring rehabilitation measures 
and responding to grievances (Environmental Resources Management 2007: 122-133).  
 
In addition, internal monitoring and evaluation would have been conducted as part of the daily 
resettlement process, and progress would have been measured against a set of indicators. External 
monitoring would have been carried out by an independent agency applying a set of indicators three to 
sixth months, eighteen months and again thirty-six months after resettlement. The results would have 
been reported to the Steering Committee and the Working Group (Environmental Resources 
Management 2007: 141-146).  
 
These arrangements were entirely ignored, except that the BPA appointed a Resettlement Officer, who is 
in charge of resettlement coordination, and some consultation did take place, although the villagers’ view 
were not always incorporated into the decision-making process (Miine 2014: 64-66, 72-74). Furthermore, 
not all relevant issues were discussed, in particular the selection of resettlement sites (Urban et al. 2015: 
583). Similarly, Sutcliffe (2009: 2-3) reported that the recommendations in the RPF for addressing villagers’ 
concerns about their livelihoodsii were not taken up during resettlement. In particular, villagers were not 
given a timeframe for resettlement or for compensation payments, and they were not informed of 
appropriate channels of communication ‘to make their grievances known.’ Authorities ignored the 
Consultation Objectives in the RPF. 
.  
To ensure the reconstruction of livelihoods after relocation, the RPF advocates the implementation of a 
Livelihood Enhancement Programme. This Programme adopts a two-pronged approach: the targeting of 
vulnerable households and the enhancement of livelihoods in resettled communities in general. The focus 
is on the major livelihood activities of the villages: agriculture; fishing; trading; and grazing, hunting and 
collection of forest products. 
  
Looking at the fishing section of the Programme and the fate of the fishing community of Agbegikuro 
whose members were resettled on dry land, it becomes clear that the Livelihood Enhancement 
Programme was not implemented. The recommendations comprise the allocation of equivalent fishing 
grounds, the development of fishing opportunities (the establishment of fishing associations, business 
planning, micro-credit support, as well as storage, transport and processing refrigeration facilities) and 
the development of alternative livelihoods (agriculture, small service enterprises and artisan workshops 
and training for other livelihoods to be identified and for which there is demand) (Environmental 
Resources Management 2007: 98). In addition, to compensate for lost fishing grounds, the RPF suggests 
providing a ‘transportation allowance for fishing equipment (boats etc.)’ and a ‘transition allowance until 
fishing livelihood is restored’ (Environmental Resources Management 2007: 94, Table 9.6). 
 
Before resettlement, the community of Agebegikuro had expressed the wish to be resettled at the river 
where there would be no flood during the rainy season to allow them continue fishing. The BPA however 
ignored the request, arguing that the community ‘lacked technical expertise to assess and assist site 
selection’ (Miine 2014: 66). Indeed, while some communication had taken place between the BPA 
Resettlement Office and communities, community suggestions were not included in the decision-making 
process (Miine 2014: 64-66). Resettlement also affected cultural life: Agbegikuro used to celebrate a 
festival involving communal fishing, during which the catch was distributed within and outside of the 
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community. Given the lack of fishing opportunities after resettlement, the festival can no longer be 
celebrated (Obour 2016: 292). Community members also claimed that, when they were resettled, they 
did not receive any seeds (having to buy them at the market instead), tools or training in farming 
(Interviews J01072010-3 and J01072010-2). 
 
The problems reach beyond former fishing communities. An overall decline in livelihoods has resulted 
from constraints on agricultural production owing to low soil quality, lack of fertilizer and lack of 
experience of resettled communities (some of which were trading and fishing communities); long distance 
to markets to sell agricultural produce; long distance to rivers for fishermen and disappearance of some 
fish species; and absence of off-farm income generation. This in turn has resulted in lack of adequate food 
supply with adverse impacts on health. To supplement income, resettlers have opened illegal mining sites 
in the forest reserve, which in turn leads to destruction of parts of the forest (Miine 2014: 75-77). At the 
same time, some farmers at Jama resettlement site reported that their crop yields have remained the 
same, having changed to planting more maize, squash and gourd instead of yam and cassava (Obour 2016: 
292). This suggests that livelihoods in the resettled communities are highly uneven depending on a range 
of factors including, but not limited to, occupational groups, existing skills and skills support. 
 
Resettlers were given three types of cash compensation: first, a one-off payment of GH¢100.00 per person 
regardless of age; second, a farm grant of GH¢50.00 per household to enable initial crop cultivation (two 
acres per household); and third, a monthly allowance for one year from May 2008 to April 2009 per 
household as temporary income support, based on calculations made by the Faculty of Human Settlement 
of Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi . This monthly allowance was meant 
to assist farmers to travel back to their fields, 4.5km from their new settlement, to harvest their produce 
while simultaneously developing their new fields at Gyama Resettlement Township (Zigah 2009: 28-29). 
However, Otu-Tei (2009: 113) said that resettlers had to spend a larger portion of the monthly allowance 
on food than on travel, because they ‘were unable to access their old farms.’ Indeed, resettlers claimed 
that even though they had been told that they could return to harvest their mangoes, they were not in 
fact allowed to do so (Interview J01072010-2). The fishing community from Agbegikuro reported 
additionally that the financial support was insufficient (Obour et al. 2016: 293).  
 
Otu-Tei (2009: 110-112) also argued that the Gyama resettlement occurred ‘immediately after the main 
season for planting maize and yam, the main staple foods in the area, because the resettlement was 
determined by the pace of the dam construction,’ even though the RPF had provided information on the 
growing seasons for all crops grown in the area. He therefore concluded that ‘critical issues’ in 
resettlement implementation, such as ‘compensation, preparation of resettlement site, relocation, 
implementation of livelihood programs, and monitoring were ignored […]. Completion of the dam was 
prioritized at the expense of sustainably restoring or improving the living conditions of the affected 
people’ (Otu-Tei 2009: 116).   
 
Writing five years after Out-Tei, Miine echoes his assessment arguing that the BPA has focussed on 
physical relocation rather than economic and social development (Miine 2014: 75). As a consequence, the 
Gyama resettlement community has ‘the growing feeling of … living in a foreign land (Miine 2014: 77).’ 
Furthermore, the lack of institutionalized procedures and the regular interference of the Gyama chief 
from who the BPA acquired the land for the resettlers ‘robs them of their freedom, causes social 
disarticulation, reduction in right to resources and powerlessness’ (Miine 2014: 77). 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
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While the Ghanaian government has added a new, possibly clean, energy facility to its energy generation 
mix and may claim to contribute its share to the global green energy agenda, local communities have 
suffered from an ill-executed resettlement programme. The project therefore exemplifies the scalar 
trade-offs occurring from a singular focus on energy generation to attain national development goals but 
a lack of engagement with water governance issues and attention to the effects on local communities. 
 
The dam shows how local socio-ecological systems are affected by the globalization of the hydropower 
industry and also by emergence of China as a key source of finance and technical capacity in hydropower 
construction. Indeed, it was Chinese engagement that enabled eventual construction of the Bui Dam. 
Local communities therefore face a particularly difficult situation in which the interests of the national 
government, multinational corporations, and emerging economies are linked. This produces a situation in 
which communities do not only face their governments but also transnationally operating actors that are 
not accountable, meaning that there are no formal processes through which local communities could hold 
transnationally operating companies to account.  
 
Furthermore, a robust environmental policy within Sinohydro and China Exim Bank could have improved 
the impact the dam has on local communities. After all, Exim Bank procedures at the time already required 
that the bank checks the quality of the environmental and social impact process during the dam planning 
process before approving the credit facility. Therefore, an improvement of environmental policies and 
credit approval procedures on the Chinese side should result in less harmful projects even in projects 
where Chinese actors are not involved in the resettlement process, as was the case for the Bui dam.  
 
Regarding nexus governance the question of who makes decisions for who is in practice determined by 
the developmental strategies of governments. A focus on extractive water use for the building up of 
electricity capacity results in neglect of the concerns of local communities. Looking at Schlosberg’s (2004) 
characteristics of environmental justice as incorporating equity, recognition and participation we can 
conclude that the Bui project meets none of these requirements fully. Environmental risks are entirely the 
problem of the resettled community, resulting for instance in lack of access to freshwater resources for 
fishing or lack of fertile land. Recognition of ethnic diversity is equally problematic, with the community 
no longer able to celebrate a traditional fishing festival, fishing communities being resettled on dry land 
without access to their traditional fishing grounds or lack of access to new fishing grounds to practice 
traditional economic activities. Moreover, there was a lack of government assistance for training in 
agricultural practices in order to reconstruct livelihoods. Participation in the decision-making process has 
also been lacking, with villagers’ requests not having been taken on board by the BPA.  
 
The consequence is deprivation in resettled communities or at least a difficult start into a new life. Also, 
some resettlers fare better than others, suggesting that pre-existing skills and knowledge such as in 
farming practices help some community members to start out easier in the new location than others. 
Government focus on building Bui for energy generation suggests a lack of equal emphasis on the difficult 
and costly task of livelihood reconstruction along the lines suggested by the Livelihood Enhancement 
Programme in the RPF.  
 
In cooperation with Chinese financiers and infrastructure companies, and supported by matching 
interests between the Chinese government’s Going Out strategy and the Ghanaian government’s energy 
strategy, a transnational alliance has been formed with the BPA as project owner. This alliance has been 
created to the detriment of the interests of project-affected people who find it difficult to make their 
voices heard. This questions the notion of the social sustainability of large hydropower projects. While 
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they may help electrification (reservoir levels permitting), local populations do not derive substantial 
benefits but suffer disproportionately.  
 
Considerations of environmental justice and scalar mismatches are therefore key to the effectiveness of 
the nexus concept.  A scalar mismatch between water extraction and distribution of benefits is at the 
heart of the problem of large hydropower plants. This mismatch should be tackled by focussing on local 
livelihoods. It is only then that the idea of nexus can produce equal benefits for project-affected people 
and urban residents who are most likely to benefit from large hydropower projects. A focus on equity, 
recognition and participation must lead to a balance between local, national and global development 
goals to make hydropower dams truly sustainable.  
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